

THE CYPRIOTE SURRENDER TO PERSIA*

At present there appears to be general agreement that Cyprus entered the Persian Empire some time between c. 545 and 539. It will be argued here that this event did not occur until 526 or 525. The point involves other, much broader issues. Any power wishing to control Cyprus must possess a substantial navy. When, then, did Persia acquire sufficient naval strength to control the eastern Mediterranean? This last problem in turn raises the question of when the Persians annexed the countries of the Levant and Asia Minor from which they drew the whole of their fleet. Finally, because elaborate theories concerning the development of sixth century Cypriote sculpture have been built upon the conclusion that Cyprus submitted to Persia c. 545, a revision of that date will have important repercussions upon the history of Cypriote art.

Before the Cypriotes became subjects of the Persians they had been under the rule of Saite Egypt.¹ The argument for Cyprus becoming a Persian dependency in the reign of Cyrus rests on Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, which includes Cyprus among the lands ruled by Cyrus and states specifically that the Cypriotes provided military support in his wars against Karia and Babylon. The relevant passages will be quoted and discussed below (pp. 156–158). The only other direct piece of evidence is Herodotus' statement (iii 19.3) in his account of Kambyses' conquest of Egypt: δόντες δὲ καὶ Κύπριοι σφέας αὐτοῦ Πέρσησι ἐστρατεύοντο ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον, 'the Cypriotes likewise gave themselves up to the Persians and joined the expedition against Egypt'.

Hill inferred from Xenophon that the Cypriotes transferred their allegiance from Egypt to Persia some time 'before the expedition against Babylon in 538' (thus placing the conquest of Babylon a year too late).² He observed that the context of Herodotus' statement about the Cypriote surrender 'might even be taken to mean that this did not happen until Cambyses was preparing to attack Egypt in 525'.³ Previous scholars had, in fact, drawn that inference.⁴ Hill decided, however, that the Herodotus passage could be reconciled with Xenophon by construing δόντες . . . σφέας αὐτοῦς to refer to a time in the past—which is of course grammatically possible—specifically some time before the fall of Babylon.⁵ Gjerstad later echoed Hill's arguments, but 'refined' his conclusions by conjecturing that the Cypriote submission was an immediate reaction to Cyrus' victory over Croesus of Lydia: 'Everybody could foresee what would happen if, and when, Kyros attacked Egypt, and so the Cypriote kings decided to leave the sinking ship at once and submit to Persia, the power of the future.' Gjerstad therefore dated the surrender of Cyprus 'c. 545'.⁶

As was noted above, this dating—expressed either as Hill's 'before Babylon' or as Gjerstad's 'c. 545'—has won wide approval. Both of the standard English language textbooks on Greek history, following (but slightly misinterpreting) Hill, associate the surrender with the fall of

* I should like to express my thanks to Professors Roger S. Bagnall and Alan Cameron who read a draft of this article and made valuable suggestions for its improvement. I alone am responsible for remaining defects.

In the notes the following abbreviations will be used:
HC G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus* i (Cambridge 1940).

KB G. Schmidt, *Kyprische Bildwerke aus dem Heraion von Samos (= Samos vii)* (Bonn 1968).

SCE *The Swedish Cyprus Expedition* iv 2 (Stockholm 1948).

¹ Hdt. ii 182.2 records the conquest of Cyprus by Amasis. I accept the common assumption that Egyptian control continued until the Persian take-over.

² HC 111. This error regarding the date of Babylon's

fall still appears from time to time: cf. *Encyclopaedia Judaica* iv (Jerusalem 1971), 34, s.v. 'Babylon'; John Forsdyke, *Greece before Homer* (London 1956, Norton ed., 1964), 70. The correct date is, of course, *Tashritu* (Sept.–Oct.) 539; cf. A. Campbell Thompson, *CAH* iii 224, with n. 1. The confusion may arise from the fact that by the Babylonian system of reckoning the period from Cyrus' assumption of the throne to the following New Year's Day was counted as his 'accession year', the year after as his 'year 1'. Cyrus' 'year 1' thus began *Nisanu* 538.

³ HC 111, n. 2.

⁴ Cf. W. Engel, *Kypros* i (Berlin 1841) 260; E. Oberhummer, *PW* xii 1 102.

⁵ HC 111, n. 2.

⁶ SCE 471, with n. 3.

Babylon.⁷ Gjerstad's date of *c.* 545 has now appeared in the revised edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, whence it will no doubt exert great influence.⁸

Gjerstad's reconstruction of the history of Cypriote sculpture in the mid-sixth century furthermore appears to lend support to the idea of Cypriote adhesion to Persia *c.* 545. Gjerstad dates the end of what he terms the Cypro-Egyptian' sculptural style to *c.* 545 on the basis that Egyptian rule in Cyprus ended then.⁹ 'Egyptian influence on Cypriote sculpture was no longer backed by political power'. He similarly attributes both the increased Hellenic influence in the so-called 'Neo-Cypriote' style and also the rise of the archaic 'Cypro-Greek' style, *c.* 540, to the fact that 'the Ionian cities in Asia Minor and Cyprus were incorporated into the Persian Empire, belonged to the same political power, and thus their cultural interrelations were facilitated'.¹⁰

Furthermore, Gjerstad sees a reflection of Cyprus' change of allegiance in the disappearance, *c.* 540, of Cypriote sculpture from Samos, Rhodes, and Naukratis. In Gjerstad's view these three cities not only imported large quantities of statuary from Cyprus but were also hosts to workshops of Cypriote artisans producing sculptural figures in their native style. These 'factories' were supposedly flourishing in the period when Samos, Rhodes, Naukratis, and Cyprus were all part of an extensive system of Egyptian dependencies and alliances. When, however, Cyprus went over to the Persians, 'it entered a state of political opposition not only to Egypt [including Naukratis], but also to Rhodes and Samos, which were not conquered by Kyros, and continued to keep their alliance with Amasis'. This condition, according to Gjerstad, led to the closing down of Cypriote workshops in these places and the suspension of trade with Cyprus. 'The abrupt end of the mass import and manufacture of Neo-Cypriote sculpture in Naukratis, Rhodes, and Samos towards *c.* 540 BC, and the fact that not a single specimen of the Archaic Cypro-Greek style which began at this date, has been found at the places mentioned—these two facts demonstrate the collapse of factories in Egypt and on the East Greek islands in consequence of the submission of Cyprus to Persia.'¹¹

It is the end of the Cypro-Egyptian style which Gjerstad dates by the termination of Egyptian rule in Cyprus. The duration of this class of sculpture is not in itself evidence of when the Cypriotes changed masters. When, however, Gjerstad suggests that the dissolution of Egypt's power in Cyprus caused the simultaneous disappearance of Egyptian artistic influence, he is not only treating both propositions as given but providing them both with additional validity by forming a logical link between them—the keystone in the arch. Likewise, Gjerstad's chronology—independently derived—and proposed explanation for increased Greek influence in Cypriote art seem to strengthen his conclusions regarding political history, while his arguments concerning the sculpture trade between Cyprus and the Ionian cities are explicitly offered as proof that Cyprus became Persian *c.* 545.

Yet problems arise at every turn. First, the dangers of using Xenophon's idealizing life of Cyrus as an historical source are notorious. Hill and Gjerstad were aware of the risks, though both took Xenophon's word that the Cypriotes fought in Cyrus' army: Gjerstad enunciated the principle that the *Cyropaedia* may be accepted when, as here, it is not contradicted by other sources.¹² This rule hardly does justice to the complexity of the matter; with a work such as the

⁷ J. B. Bury—R. Meiggs, *History of Greece*⁴ (London 1975) 148; N. G. L. Hammond, *History of Greece*² (Oxford 1967) 176. Hammond tacitly corrects Hill's dating of the fall of Babylon to 539. Both authors seem not to notice that Hill used the Babylonian campaign only as a *terminus ante* and that he thought the Cypriotes had surrendered by the time of the Karian war.

⁸ V. Karageorghis, *CAH*² iii 3, 69. Cf. also M. Yon, *Ktéma* vi (1981), 51 who as a compromise between Hill and Gjerstad says 'vers 540 a.C.' J. V. Fine, *The Ancient Greeks* (Cambridge, Mass. 1983), 256 merely paraphrases Hdt. iii 19.3 and assigns no date to the Cypriote surrender. Only two recent writers have favored a date

in the time of Kambyzes. F. G. Maier, *Cyperm, Insel am Kreuzweg der Geschichte* (Stuttgart 1964) 32 gives the year as 525 but offers no argumentation. M. L. Chaumont, 'Chypre dans l'empire achéménide' in Πρακτικά τοῦ πρώτου διεθνoῦς κυπριολογικοῦ συνεδρίου i (Nicosia 1972) 180 says 'probablement 526', relying mainly on the reasoning of O. Leuze (on whom *cf.* below n. 13).

⁹ Cf. *SCE* 208.

¹⁰ *SCE* 362.

¹¹ *SCE* 370.

¹² *HC* 111, n. 2; *SCE* 471, n. 3.

Cyropaedia it is important to consider whether a given detail has been included to advance the author's ideological purpose.

Secondly, Hdt. iii 19.3 may in any case not be as chronologically ambiguous as Hill and Gjerstad say. What is more important, other passages in Herodotus indicate that Cyprus was not incorporated into the Persian Empire until the reign of Cambyses.

Finally, recent proposed adjustments in the chronology and classification of Cypriote sculpture as well as alternative explanations for its stylistic development challenge Gjerstad's association of cultural and political change, and remove the archaeological support for a Persian take-over c. 545.

I

Xenophon's aim in the *Cyropaedia* was, as Cicero recognized,¹³ not to write an historically accurate biography of the founder of the Persian Empire, but to characterize the ideal ruler. The *Cyropaedia's* program, as H. R. Breitenbach notes,¹⁴ is revealed in its introductory section, which discusses the various forms of constitution and the difficulty of governing men. The work belongs, in fact, to the genre of *politeia* literature and is a contribution to the debate over the best form of government.¹⁵ Breitenbach observes that all aspects of the *Cyropaedia* are consequently subordinated to the didactic purpose of elucidating the three chief qualities of the perfect ruler: moral rectitude, military prowess, and the ability to organize and control the state.¹⁶

Breitenbach's extensive analysis of the *Cyropaedia*¹⁷ shows that serious historical distortions arise from Xenophon's desire to depict Cyrus as the embodiment of these traits. For instance, in the *Cyropaedia* Cyrus does not acquire Media through an impious war against his grandfather but as part of a dowry.¹⁸ The Lydian and Babylonian campaigns are compressed into one huge war to enhance—still further—Cyrus' abilities as a soldier.¹⁹ Institutions of government, some of which at least must have been Cyrus' foundations, are attributed to him in forms which must have come about only after long development.²⁰ Many smaller items could be added.²¹ There may be some reliable details,²² but every detail whether or not refuted by other evidence must be considered suspect if it contributes to Cyrus' glorification: the testimony of the *Cyropaedia* should not be trusted *unless corroborated* by other sources.

The Cypriotes and Cyprus appear six times in the *Cyropaedia*. The passages in question may be arranged in three groups according to content. The first group comprises a single passage (vi 2.10): the Cypriotes, among others, sent an army to aid Croesus against Cyrus. This item has no bearing on the question at hand. (Gjerstad in fact rejects the statement since Herodotus expressly says that Croesus received no aid from his allies.²³ One might also observe that the large body of

¹³ Cic. *Q.Fr.* i 1.23; cf. Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 4.1. After completing this article I discovered that very similar arguments concerning the *Cyr.*'s reliability had been made by O. Leuze, *Die Satrapieneinteilung in Syrien und im Zweistromlande von 520–320* (Halle 1935) 6–9. Leuze, however, takes for granted that Hdt. iii 19.3 proves that the Cypriotes surrendered to Cambyses. Since Leuze's remarks seem to have gone unnoticed (except by Chaumont [n. 8]) it seems useful to restate the arguments here. My own observations are largely dependent on Breitenbach (cf. next n.).

¹⁴ *PW* ix A 2 1707–42.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 1708.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 1709.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 1709–17.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 1709.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 1710–12.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 1716.

²¹ Cf. in particular the retrojection of persons from

Xenophon's time to that of Cyrus, and the appearance of names otherwise unattested: *ibid.* 1713–14. Breitenbach believes this last group represents unknown contemporaries of Xenophon, but it is just as likely that they are wholly inventions.

²² He is even right where Herodotus is wrong. He correctly states that Cyrus' father was king of Persia (cf. *ibid.* 1709), though he may have said so out of a desire to legitimize and aggrandize Cyrus rather than out of knowledge. The report, not found in Herodotus, that Gobryas, a vassal of the 'Assyrian' (i.e., Babylonian) king, defected to Cyrus may also be correct, though there are problems: cf. *ibid.* 1712.

²³ *SCE* 471, n. 3; Hdt. i 77; 81; 82. Gjerstad claims that the report of Cypriote aid to Croesus is also contradicted by *Cyr.* ii 1.5, but that passage merely states that the Karians, Kilikians, and Paphlagonians refused Lydia's appeal for aid.

allied troops which Xenophon places at Croesus' disposal aims at magnifying Cyrus' victory.²⁴

In the second group are those passages which simply include Cyprus among the lands ruled by Cyrus:

(a) i 1.4 [Κύρος] ἐπήρξε δὲ καὶ Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, καταβάς δ' ἐπὶ θάλατταν καὶ Κυπρίων καὶ Αἴγυπτίων.

(b) viii 6.21 Καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὴν ἀρχὴν ὥριζεν αὐτῷ [sc. Κύρῳ] πρὸς ἕω μὲν ἡ Ἐρυθρὰ θάλαττα, πρὸς ἄρκτον δὲ ὁ Εὐξείνιος πόντος, πρὸς ἑσπέραν δὲ Κύπρος καὶ Αἴγυπτος, πρὸς μεσημβρίαν δὲ Αἰθιοπία.

(c) viii 8.1 [ἡ Κύρου βασιλεία] ὠρίσθη γὰρ πρὸς ἕω μὲν τῇ Ἐρυθρᾷ θαλάττῃ, πρὸς ἄρκτον δὲ τῷ Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ, πρὸς ἑσπέραν δὲ Κύπρῳ καὶ Αἰγύπτῳ, πρὸς μεσημβρίαν δὲ Αἰθιοπία.²⁵

Each of these passages appears in surveys of Cyrus' empire. The inclusion of Egypt shows that Xenophon was not concerned to describe accurately the extent of Cyrus' realm. Herodotus' account of Cambyses' conquest of Egypt will have been well known to Xenophon's readers, and the fictional nature of the *Cyropaedia* will have been nowhere more apparent. Indeed, when Xenophon goes on to relate in viii 6.21 that the borders of Cyrus' empire were uninhabitable due to extremes of climate we have clearly entered the realm of fantasy. The inclusion of Egypt is an example of the *Cyropaedia*'s tendency to ascribe to Cyrus the accomplishments of his successors, and the boundaries of Persian territory are exaggerated to represent Cyrus as the ruler of a world-wide empire.²⁶ Surely Cyprus may be mentioned to serve these same ends, and the fabulous and tendentious nature of these passages clearly disqualifies them as evidence that Cyprus was annexed by Persia in the reign of Cyrus.

The final category includes those passages cited by Hill and Gjerstad as evidence that the Cypriotes accompanied Cyrus on campaign:

(a) vii 4.1.–2 [The Karians fall into civil strife and appeal to Cyrus for aid. He sends his general Adousios to Karia] καὶ Κίλικες δὲ καὶ Κύπριοι πάνυ προθύμως αὐτῷ συνεστράτευσαν. ὦν ἕνεκα οὐδ' ἔπεμψε πῶποτε Πέρσην σατράπην οὔτε Κιλικίων οὔτε Κυπρίων, ἀλλ' ἦρκουν αὐτῷ αἰεὶ οἱ ἐπιχώριοι βασιλεύοντες· δασμὸν μέντοι ἐλάμβανε καὶ στρατιᾶς ὅποτε δέοιτο ἐπήγγελλεν αὐτοῖς.

(b) viii 6.8 Κιλικίας δὲ καὶ Κύπρου καὶ Παφλαγόνων οὐκ ἔπεμψε Πέρσας σατράπας, ὅτι ἐκόντες ἐδόκουν συστρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνα· δασμοὺς μέντοι συνέταξεν ἀποφέρειν καὶ τούτους.

The context of these passages is again idealizing. The *Cyropaedia*'s account of the Karian war (viii 4.1–6), in which the Cypriotes participated according to the first passage, is so different from the Herodotean version that an independent source had been suspected. Breitenbach, however, pointed out that the discrepancies are due to Xenophon's typically edifying transformation of the story: an aggressive war of conquest becomes the resolution of civil strife by a benevolent outside power; the embarrassing Thyestean figure of Harpagos, who according to Herodotus managed the subjugation of Karia for Cyrus, is replaced by the almost certainly fictional Adousios.²⁷

Similarly, viii 6.8 forms part of an imaginative description of Cyrus' organization of his

²⁴ Cf. Breitenbach, *PW* ix A 2 1711: plans formed and never fulfilled by Croesus are actually carried out in the *Cyr.* 'zur Steigerung des Erfolges von Kyros'.

²⁵ The whole of *Cyr.* viii 8 is condemned as spurious by some, but cf. Breitenbach, *PW* ix A 2 1741–42.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 1716.

²⁷ Adousios bears a purely Greek name (cf. F.

Bechtel, *Die historische Personennamen des Griechischen bis zur Kaiserzeit* [Halle 1917] 510), as does Pantheia, the Susian heroine of the *Cyr.*'s love story (outline and reff. Breitenbach *PW* ix A 2 1717–18). The giving of Greek names to oriental persons no doubt served as a signal to Xenophon's readers that the characters in question were purely fictional.

empire into satrapies (viii 6.1–17). Darius' Behistun inscription proves that satrapies had been set up before his own reign.²⁸ Some of these were probably formed in the time of Cyrus, though that is only surmise. There can be no doubt, however, that the *Cyropaedia's* account of Cyrus' organization of satrapies is fictional. There the provinces cover only Asia Minor and Arabia; the rest of the empire is left out of account entirely (viii 6.7). The statement that Arabia received a satrap is directly contradicted by Hdt. iii 88.1, which says that the Arabs were allies, but never subjects of the Persians. Likewise, the assertion that Cyrus imposed regular taxation on the provinces (viii 6.3; cf. 6.8) goes against Herodotus' explicit statement that Cyrus collected no regular tribute.²⁹

The scene in which Cyrus organizes his satrapies also contains a moralizing aspect: the king is shown rewarding those who served him well with appointments to governorships.³⁰ What is more, the two passages quoted above state that Cyrus rewarded the loyalty of the Cypriotes, Kilikians, and Paphlagonians by not imposing satraps upon them and allowing them to be ruled by their own princes (subject of course to the Great King!). Here again Xenophon may be ascribing to Cyrus details of governance actually worked out by later kings. In the better attested period of Persian history, from the reign of Darius on, Cyprus, Kilikia, and Paphlagonia retained their native kings and were not administered by satraps.³¹ Kilikia and Paphlagonia may have been annexed by Cyrus en route to Lydia (though on Kilikia see below), and the arrangement by which these nations kept their own rulers does perhaps date to his time. It need not follow that Cyprus also received this *beneficium* from Cyrus; it suits Xenophon's purpose to retroject this praiseworthy measure to Cyrus' reign.

Thus suspicious circumstances surround all the relevant passages in the *Cyropaedia*.

II

Hdt. iii 19.3, quoted above (p. 154), is often translated as if it meant merely that the Cypriotes participated in Kambyses' campaign against Egypt.³² But *διδόναι σφέας αὐτούς* in Herodotus regularly means 'to surrender themselves', 'to give themselves up to the protection of'.³³ Hill and Gjerstad, of course, do not deny this meaning, but insist that *δόντες* gives no precise information as to when the Cypriotes surrendered themselves to the Persians. Surely, however, the sentence is most naturally construed by taking the participle as circumstantial, close in time to the main verb *ἔστρατεύοντο*. The action of the Cypriotes in joining Kambyses' expedition would have immediately followed their voluntary surrender and would have been a token of good faith.

²⁸ Cf. C. R. Lehmann-Haupt, *PW* ii A 85. Lehmann-Haupt, coll. 85–90, is overly credulous in evaluating the *Cyr.*'s testimony on satrapies before Darius. Cf. Breitenbach's remarks (next n.).

²⁹ Breitenbach, *PW* ix A 2 1714–15.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 1714.

³¹ For the continued existence and activity of the Cypriote kings under Persian rule cf., *inter al.*, Hdt. v 104; 108–15. On the 'Syennesis' kings who ruled Kilikia for the Persians cf. How and Wells i 94; U. Kahrstedt *PW* iv A 1023–24. Vassal kings of Paphlagonia: J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (London 1983) 182. That no satrap was put in charge of Cyprus—though it was considered part of the fifth satrapy—is indicated not only by the continuance of native Cypriote rulers throughout the Achaemenid period, but also by the fact that on the three occasions when Cyprus revolted from the Persians, the task of suppressing the rebellion did not automatically fall to any particular governor but was assigned by the Persian court to persons specially

commissioned for the task. When Cyprus joined the Ionian revolt of 499, Darius sent an obscure person named Artybios to reduce the island (Hdt. v 108.1; he is described merely as *ἄνδρα Πέρσην*). The job of suppressing Euagoras I's revolt was entrusted to Hekatomnos, dynast of Karia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia (*FGrH* 115 F 103; cf. Diod. xiv 98.3); later the command was transferred to Tiribazos (satrap of Asia), Glos (Tiribazos' son-in-law), and Orontes (Artaxerxes' II's son-in-law; Cf. Diod. xv 2.2; 3.2). Idrieus, dynast of Karia was assigned to halt the Cypriote rebellion of 351–44; he handed the job over to Phokion and Euagoras II (Diod. xvi 42.6–7; 46.1–3).

³² Thus A. D. Godley (Loeb ed.): 'The Cyprians too had come of their own accord to aid the Persians against Egypt'. Similarly, G. Rawlinson (Modern Library), A. de Selincourt (Penguin).

³³ Cf. J. E. Powell *Lexicon to Herodotus*, s.v. 'δίδωμι' 7a.

Naturally, the defection of Cyprus to Persia would have depended on Persian control of the seas. Egypt's own naval strength was considerable.³⁴ Unless the Persians possessed an equally formidable navy the Cypriotes would have been ill-advised to join them. Herodotus, however, suggests that Cyrus had no fleet at all. He explicitly states this for the period immediately after the fall of Lydia; although Cyrus had resolved to subjugate the Ionian cities, the islanders had nothing to fear since the Persians lacked a navy: τοῖσι δὲ αὐτῶν [sc. Ἰώνων] νησιώτησι ἦν δεινὸν οὐδέν. οὔτε γὰρ Φοίνικες ἦσαν κω Περσέων κατήκοοι οὔτε αὐτοὶ οἱ Πέρσαι ναυβάται (i 143.1). The Knidians, in fact, sought to render themselves immune from Persian attack by cutting a channel across their peninsula and severing their connection with the mainland.³⁵

There is no indication that Persia's lack of a navy was remedied before the end of Cyrus' reign.³⁶ Indeed, Herodotus expressly tells us that the credit for gaining control of the seas for Persia belonged to Kambyses.³⁷ Hdt. i 143.1, just quoted, shows that Persian sea power depended upon the Phoenicians. At Hdt. iii 19.3, immediately before the mention of Cyprus' submission, it is reported that the Phoenicians likewise had voluntarily gone over to the Persians. The date of the Phoenician surrender is, once again, not stated precisely, but here also the most natural interpretation of the text is that their submission occurred just before they joined the Egyptian expedition.

The surrender of Phoenicia was probably occasioned by the agreement made between Kambyses and an Arab chieftain by which the Persians were to have safe conduct through the desert.³⁸ With the southern route to Egypt and Syria–Palestine open to Persian power the Phoenician cities may have felt themselves in danger of being taken from the landward side.³⁹ Their submission will in turn explain not only the Cypriote defection, but also the *volte-face* of Polykrates of Samos, who abandoned Amasis for Kambyses as the campaign against Egypt was in preparation.⁴⁰ With the Samians, no doubt, came the rest of the East Greek islanders: it is in the course of the Egyptian expedition that Greek ships appear for the first time in the service of Persia.⁴¹

Kambyses began organizing the Egyptian campaign while Amasis was still on the throne.⁴² The subjugation of Egypt must have long been a Persian objective. Herodotus says that Cyrus contemplated it.⁴³ The key to achieving this conquest was apparently provided by a certain Phanes of Halikarnassos, a deserter from Amasis' mercenary forces, who was the one who advised Kambyses to make a compact with the Arabs.⁴⁴ Amasis died near the end of 526 and was succeeded by his son Psammenitos. The actual campaign was launched in the spring of 525, and Psammenitos was deposed in May/June of that year.⁴⁵ It seems reasonable to allow a year and a

³⁴ Cf. Hdt. vii 89.2 where the Egyptians are said to have contributed 200 ships to Xerxes' expedition in 480.

³⁵ Hdt. i 174.3.

³⁶ Hdt. i 169.2 reports that the Ionian islanders surrendered after the fall of mainland Ionia. This must, however, be an error; cf. How and Wells *ad loc.* where, however, Chios is said to have submitted. For this there is no evidence and it is unlikely that the Chians would have surrendered while Samos remained independent. Furthermore the attempt of the Knidians to make their city an island seems to come after this time.

³⁷ Hdt. iii 34.4: Kambyses is said to have surpassed his father because he rules as much as Cyrus plus Egypt and the sea. The scene is probably a fiction designed to illustrate Kambyses' monstrous vanity; but the detail is circumstantial and would not have been used unless true.

³⁸ Hdt. iii 7.2; cf. iii 88.

³⁹ Cf. the speedy submission of the Phoenician cities—all save Tyre, of course—once Alexander had

passed Issos and threatened them from the north. The decision of the Cypriotes to go over to Alexander while he was besieging Tyre was motivated not by Hellenic sympathies but by the fear that they could not withstand him once he had captured Phoenicia: Arr. *Anab.* ii 20.3.

⁴⁰ Hdt. iii 44.1. So also G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* ii² 511. The report in Hdt. iii 43.2 that it was Amasis who broke with Polykrates is, of course, a fabrication meant to give point to the fable of the fish and the ring.

⁴¹ Hdt. iii 13.1: a Mytilenean ship used to bear a message to the Egyptians besieged in Memphis.

⁴² Hdt. iii 1.1; cf. 4.1

⁴³ Hdt. i 153.4.

⁴⁴ Hdt. iii 4.1–2.

⁴⁵ Hdt. iii 10.1–3. Psammenitos' reign began in Dec. 526 and lasted only six months. For the dates cf. F. K. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jhd. vor der Zeitwende* (Berlin 1953) 156–57.

half at most between the agreement with the Arabs and the invasion itself.⁴⁶ The Arab treaty should then be placed at the beginning of 526, or at the earliest late 527.⁴⁷

The submission of Phoenicia, Cyprus, and the East Greek cities may thus be placed between early 526 and spring 525. With some modification the date favored by older scholars for the Cypriote surrender may be restored. Furthermore it seems that the rise of Persian naval power should be dated to exactly the same time.

It might be objected that even without Phoenicia and the Greek islanders the Persians should have been able to muster a substantial navy from mainland Ionia, the Hellespont, and southern Asia Minor. Ionia, however was subdued only by great force. The devastation of its cities must have crippled whatever ability the Ionians might have had to contribute ships. The powerful Phokaians abandoned their city altogether (though it is said more than half soon returned) as did the less important Teians.⁴⁸ Fifty years later at the battle of Lade only Miletos, of the mainland cities, was able to gather a substantial fleet: eighty ships, in fact the second largest contingent.⁴⁹ The Milesians, of course, had made an early peace with Cyrus.⁵⁰ Potentially they had great naval strength, as Lade shows. In the eighth century they are said to have held the thalassocracy of the Aegean.⁵¹ Under the tyrant Thrasyboulos in the late seventh and early sixth centuries the strength of their navy made it useless for the Lydians to besiege them by land.⁵² Herodotus makes it clear, however, that after Thrasyboulos Miletos suffered two generations of debilitating stasis, and that she revived only during the tyranny of Histiaios. The economic effect of this civil strife should not be minimized. The Parians who came to arbitrate between the opposing factions found all but a few farms ruined. This trouble must have begun in the time of Alyattes and continued well into Kambyses' reign. In such conditions it is improbable that Miletos could have assembled a fleet until recovery began under Darius.⁵³

The cities of the Hellespontine region (third satrapy), which are said to have contributed one hundred ships to Xerxes invasion,⁵⁴ do not appear as Persian possessions until Darius' provincial reorganization.⁵⁵ It is likely that they too surrendered to Persia only in 526/5, following the example of the Ionian islanders. The Hellespontine cities are not mentioned in Herodotus' account of Cyrus' operations in Asia Minor, and some of them had not yet submitted at the time of Darius' Scythian expedition.⁵⁶

If Herodotus is correct,⁵⁷ the most important navies of southern Asia Minor were those of the Lykians, Karians, and Kilikians. These peoples contributed 50, 70, and 100 ships respectively to the Persian fleet in 480.⁵⁸ Lykia and Karia were subdued in the time of Cyrus. In Lykia the carnage was great⁵⁹ and this area may also have taken some time to recover. Karia on the other hand was apparently reduced without great violence.⁶⁰ But the Karians, at least in the late sixth

⁴⁶ The Persians could mount a campaign with considerable speed. Less than a year elapsed between the last operations of the Ionian revolt and Mardonios' expedition against Greece; cf. A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (London 1962) 215–17, 221.

⁴⁷ Since Kambyses chose to march through the Arabian Desert, he must not yet have been in possession of northern Syria, through which lay the natural route between Mesopotamia and Egypt. Cf. the route of Alexander from Egypt to Gaugamela, and the movements of Necho and Nebuchadrezzar in the Charchemish campaign of 605. On this campaign and the difficulties of crossing the desert between Mesopotamia and Syria–Palestine cf. R. Campbell Thompson, *CAH* iii 210–11. The area between Phoenicia and northern Mesopotamia was no doubt 'filled in' by the Persians shortly after the Egyptian campaign.

⁴⁸ Hdt. i 164–68; cf. Burn (n. 46) 46–7, 210.

⁴⁹ Hdt. vi 8.1; 8.2: the Phokaians contributed only three ships, Teos only seventeen.

⁵⁰ Hdt. i 141.4.

⁵¹ Cf. How and Wells ii 11.

⁵² Hdt. i 17.3.

⁵³ Period of anarchy in Miletos: Hdt. v 28, whence it is clear that the period of recovery coincided with Histiaios' reign. For the chronology in general cf. How and Wells *ad loc.*; D. G. Hogarth *CAH* iii 517. Ruined farms: Hdt. v 29.

⁵⁴ Hdt. vii 95.2.

⁵⁵ Hdt. iii 90.2.

⁵⁶ Hdt. iv 144.

⁵⁷ But cf. How and Wells ii 364–66; Burn (n. 46) 330–32.

⁵⁸ Hdt. vii 92 (Lykians); 93 (Karians); 90–91 (Kilikians).

⁵⁹ Hdt. i 176.

⁶⁰ Hdt. i 174.1: the Karians subdued without performing any outstanding deeds; the Pedasians alone put up stubborn resistance (175).

and fifth centuries, show no signs of having been conspicuous for their seamanship.⁶¹ They may have produced so large a fleet for Xerxes' expedition only under the stimulus of an especially urgent command from the king. Finally, Kilikia too is not mentioned as an area subjugated by Cyrus. It was not part of Croesus' empire,⁶² and Cyrus did not pass through it on his march to Lydia.⁶³ It does, however, appear in the list of nations tributary to Darius (fourth satrapy).⁶⁴ A likely occasion for its entry into the Persian fold is again the time of the Phoenician and Cypriote surrenders.

Though much remains uncertain, the evidence strongly suggests that the Persians had no effective naval capability before the invasion of Egypt. The annexation of Phoenicia will have had a significance for Persia far beyond that of providing her with her most important naval contingent.⁶⁵ It will also have brought under her control large stretches of new coastline, and with this area a great number of ships for her fleet additional to those of the Phoenicians. Had the Persians ever acquired the ability to use this armada themselves instead of relying on the skill and loyalty of their subject allies, their naval strength would have been even more awesome than it in fact was.⁶⁶

III

It will be remembered that three main points are of concern in Gjerstad's attempt to correlate the development of Cypriote sculpture with political events: the disappearance of the Cypro-Egyptian style; increased Greek influence in Cypriote sculpture, beginning in the Neo-Cypriote period, and culminating in the Cypro-Greek style; and the closing of Cypriote workshops in Samos, Rhodes, and Naukratis.

The end of the Cypro-Egyptian style is in itself no evidence for 545 as the date of Egypt's loss of Cyprus (above, p. 154f.). It might therefore seem sufficient for present purposes to redate the lower limit of this class of sculpture to 525. But the very notion of a Cypro-Egyptian style has lately been denied. C. Vermeule has shown that a Cypriote limestone head in Boston—nearly an exact replica of a head in New York classified as Cypro-Egyptian by Gjerstad⁶⁷—bears close affinities to Archaic Ionian work of c. 500 and should be dated to the beginning of the fifth century. From this late appearance of Egyptian elements in Cypriote sculpture Vermeule

⁶¹ Karian participation in the Ionian revolt was confined to land operations (Hdt. v 117–21), even though some parts of the country were still independent after Lade and the fall of Miletos (vi 25.2). Likewise the Karians' exploits in the Peloponnesian War consisted of only a single land-based action (Thuc. iii 19.2: the Karians massacre an Athenian force).

On the other hand the Karians are said to have been formidable sea fighters in the 'legendary era'. Eusebius records a thalassocracy for them (Schoene i 225). They are said to have inhabited the Cyclades before the time of Minos (Thuc. i 4); to have served in his navy (Hdt. i 171.2); and to have practiced extensive piracy (Thuc. i 8.1). Karian presence in Xerxes' fleet is substantiated by the fact that Herodotus names some of their contingent leaders: Aridolis of Alabanda (vii 195); Histiaios of Termera, Pigres, Damasithymos (98), and the redoubtable Artemisia (99).

⁶² Hdt. i 28.

⁶³ He followed the route of the Royal Road which ran through Armenia into Kappadokia where he met Croesus at Pteria; cf. How and Wells i 95.

⁶⁴ Hdt. iii 90. 3.

⁶⁵ The Phoenician contingent the most important

part of the Persian fleet: Hdt. iii 19.2; vii 96.1. Phoenician ships alone make up the Persian fleet: v 108–12; vi 28.1; 33.2; 41.1; 104.1.

⁶⁶ The repatriation of the Judaeans exiles by Cyrus in 538 (*Ezra* 1.1–4) might appear to indicate that the Persians were already in possession of Syria–Palestine. But Cyrus' allowing the Jews to leave Babylon does not in itself signify that he controlled the area to which they returned. That the returnees were able to occupy the Jerusalem area is not surprising: the place had remained a ruin since the Babylonian siege (still so in the time of Nehemiah: *Neh.* 1.2) and Cyrus' military aid would not have been needed for settlement to take place. Any such aid would surely have been mentioned (cf. the financial help given to the Jews in *Ezra* 1.7–11). Further, the depredations which the Jews suffered at the hands of the surrounding peoples from the time of Cyrus until the time of Darius (*Ezra* 4.1–5) suggest that there was no powerful authority in the area capable of maintaining order. The delay in building the Second Temple, again until the time of Darius (*Ezra* 6.15), indicates that it was not until his reign that Persian rule became effective in the area.

⁶⁷ SCE pl. vi, upper right.

concludes that the use of Egyptianizing motifs is a social or ethnic convention in Cyprus, not inseparably linked to the period of Egyptian supremacy in the island.⁶⁸

Vermeule's interpretation is particularly attractive in view of the fact that Gjerstad himself sees Egyptian influence in Cypriote art work throughout the period from 650 to 450.⁶⁹ What is more, there are disturbing qualities about Gjerstad's alleged Cypro-Egyptian sculptural class: the category contains only a very small number of pieces (Gjerstad himself identifies only twelve examples).⁷⁰ Furthermore the pieces display a striking variety of style themselves.⁷¹ On these two counts alone one might have suspected that the 'Cypro-Egyptian' statues should, as Vermeule suggests, be absorbed into other classes.

Gerhard Schmidt's work on the Cypriote statuary found at the Heraion on Samos⁷² causes further difficulties for Gjerstad's interpretation. These abundant finds—mostly terracottas but some limestones as well—permitted Schmidt to study an unbroken series of Cypriote figures from the late eighth to the mid-sixth century, securely dated on the basis of stratigraphy. Schmidt's arrangement of the sculpture dispenses with Gjerstad's bewildering progression of overlapping styles, and shows that the Neo-Cypriote class—wherein Gjerstad sees the first signs of Greek influence—ends shortly before 550 at the latest.⁷³ His study of the Neo-Cypriote pieces demonstrates that Gjerstad's assertion of Ionian influence upon this style is erroneous.⁷⁴ After the middle of the sixth century Cypriote artists will have abandoned the native Neo-Cypriote style and will have striven to imitate archaic Greek sculpture which by 550 was in full flower. It will, in fact, have been the maturation of Greek sculpture with its overwhelming attractiveness, and not a realignment in the sphere of politics, which will have occasioned the rise of the Cypro-Greek style.⁷⁵

The disappearance of Cypriote sculpture from Samos can accordingly be linked to the appearance of a strong Ionian sculptural tradition of which Cypriote statuary was, after the mid-sixth century, but a poor and undesirable imitation. Furthermore, Schmidt's analysis of the material used in the Cypriote terracottas found in Samos shows that they are made of Cypriote rather than Samian clay. This finding removes the possibility that these pieces were manufactured by an *atelier* of Cypriotes working on Samos since it is inconceivable that sculptors would have brought in clay from Cyprus when a plentiful supply of the far superior local clay was available.⁷⁶ There were, then, no Cypriote factories to be closed down as a result of political developments.

The same arguments apply to Cypriote statuary found in Rhodes and Naukratis.⁷⁷ In the latter place, however, the situation is somewhat more complex. Here have been found alabaster figures whose style is derived from Cypriote work. The material, and the fact that the style is a purely local variation on mainstream Cypriote work, make it certain that these pieces were produced in Naukratis itself.⁷⁸ These finds might signify a workshop of Cypriotes in the city, but the statues might as easily have been produced by non-Cypriotes working under Cypriote

⁶⁸ C. Vermeule, 'Cypriote sculpture, the late Archaic and early Classical period', *AJA* lxxviii (1974) 287–90; cf. esp. 289. Vermeule's observation that the statues discovered at Golgoi seem to have been arranged according to 'ethnic' group is very suggestive.

⁶⁹ Egyptian influence in the 'Proto-Cypriote' period (c. 650): *SCE* 355; in 'Neo-Cypriote' (560–520): 108, 358; at the end of the 'Cypro-Archaic' period (c. 450): 103.

⁷⁰ *SCE* 103–04.

⁷¹ Cf. *SCE* pl. vi ('Limestone sculptures. Cypro-Egyptian style.') where the figures at upper right and left look as if they should be classed with figures upper right and left pl. viii ('Eastern Neo-Cypriote style'). Pl. vi, lower half, on the other hand, has that nose which is

typical only of Cypriote sculpture and the figure bears a strong resemblance—at least in terms of the facial features and notwithstanding differences of dress and hair style—to the figure in the upper half of p. ii ('First Proto-Cypriote style').

⁷² *KB*.

⁷³ For Gjerstad's chronology cf. *SCE* 207–11 (no less than three styles running concurrently between 560 and 545). Schmidt's chronology: *KB* 95–98.

⁷⁴ *KB* 124.

⁷⁵ *KB* 2; 124.

⁷⁶ *KB* 119.

⁷⁷ *KB* 114–16.

⁷⁸ *KB* 114–15.

influence.⁷⁹ One piece of evidence for a sixth century colony of Cypriote craftsmen at Naukratis must, however, be discarded. This is a statue base, discovered in the 1899 excavations of the city, which bears the signature Σίκων [ἐπ]οίη|σε Κύπ[ριος].⁸⁰ Gjerstad pointed to this inscription as definite proof of the presence of Cypriote sculptors in Naukratis before 540;⁸¹ but his interpretation is untenable since the letter forms indicate that the inscription was cut in the fourth century.⁸²

To summarize: (i) The *Cyropaedia* provides no reliable independent testimony for the career of Cyrus or for the status of Cyprus in his reign. (ii) Herodotus indicates that Persia annexed Cyprus, and indeed first acquired the ability to control the seas around the island, only at the time of Cambyses' Egyptian campaign. (iii) The picture of the development of Cypriote sculpture built up by Gjerstad rests on an assumption which should have been questioned *a priori*—namely that art and politics inevitably move in tandem—and his conclusions have been criticized in detail.

Gjerstad's premise is an expression of the concept of cultural imperialism, an idea which is surely anachronistic in most ancient contexts. In cv *J.H.S.* (1985) F. G. Maier examined the application of this notion to the history of fifth and early fourth century Cyprus.⁸³ He showed that it led to a pattern of circular reasoning and to conclusions which were often without firm foundation. None the less these results too have received wide approval. Now that some of the methodological flaws in past research are becoming apparent specialists in Cypriote studies can begin to re-think the history of the Archaic and Classical periods. Meanwhile, non-specialists will need to approach what is now the standard account with caution.

HENRY JAY WATKIN

New York

⁷⁹ Cf. J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas*³ (London 1980) 126. These alabasters are part of the vexed question of the 'mixed style' on which cf. *KB* 116–18 and B. Lewe, *Studien zur archaischen kyprischen Plastik* (Diss. Frankfurt 1975) 25–30. The problem of the origin and nature of the mixed style has yet to be solved. These pieces cannot, therefore, be used at present to illuminate cultural and commercial relations between Cyprus and

Ionia.

⁸⁰ Original publication: D. G. Hogarth, *BSA* v (1898–99) 32.

⁸¹ *SCE* 318; 321.

⁸² Cf. F. H. Marshall, *BMInsc.* iv. 2, no. 1081.

⁸³ F. G. Maier, 'Factoids in Ancient History: the case of fifth-century Cyprus', *JHS* cv (1985) 32–39.